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ARGUMENT

Appellant FBAC respectfully disputes the contentions of Respondent
Workforce Service in its assertions Petitioner FBAC failed to martial evidence
sufficient to establish an independently established business. FBAC re-assets
the testimony of, as included in its initial brief "addendum" of UPD Secondary
Employment Office, by and through its coordinator, Kenneth Hansen.
FBAC assets that the case law, statues and administrative rules have not
given fair and adequate consideration. In support thereof, FBAC asserts that the
Board failed to give consideration to the testimony relevant to the unique nature
of the relationship between UPD off-duty officers and their employer, UPD. As
previously cited and annotated, UPD requires, by State law and UPD policy that
any and all off-duty officers could only perform the security and provide the
police presence to third party, private contractors, but through the voluntary
application of UPD officers seeking off-duty employment to be administered
solely and independently of any and all third parties. Mr. Hansen provided first
hand testimony and knowledge as to the policies, procedures, administration,
assignment and intermediary role of UPD Secondary Employment Office in his
capacity as the designated, named and serving coordinator for said office.
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In the matter of Petro-Hunt,LLC v. Dept 't of Workforce Servs, 197 P3d.
107 (Utah App 2008), the Court ratified and found that Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(1)(b) provides seven factors intended to aid a decision maker's
~

analysis of whether a worker was customarily engaged in an independently
established business. Further, the Court noted that these factors are " ... intended
only as aids in the analysis of the facts of each case. As stated in Respondent's
brief at page 16, having drawn from the decision in Petro-Hunt:
... indeed, the degree of importance of each factor varies depending
on the service and the factual context in which it is performed. Id.
"The appropriate weight to assign to each factor in the test for whether
an individual is an employee or an independent contractor is a fact-

~

sensitiye question that will differ in every case due to the individuality
of fact patterns and the vagaries of various vocations ... "

FBAC contends that the clear and undisputed testimony ofUPD ·
Employment Office coordinator, Kenneth Hansen provided the residuum of
legal evidence competent in a court of law as to the following:
41

1.

Both State law and UPD policy mandated that any off-duty officer could

only perform security and provide police present after application and
acceptance into UPD Secondary Employment Office, which stand as a separate
and distinct entity apart for UPD as a State law enforcement agency;
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2.

Only by and through UPD Secondary Employment Office, as the sole and

exclusive means by which an off-duty officer may ply his/her unique certified

~

skill and training in law enforcement:
3.

Participation in UPD Secondary Employment was strictly voluntary by

UPD officers;
4. UPD Secondary Employment Office was and is a separate and distinct

iv

entity from UPD as a law duly designated and authorized State law enforcement
agency:
5.

UPD Secondary Employment Office operated and served as a business

entity for the benefit of off-duty UPD officers, providing services which
included, but not limited to: invoicing, collection of fees, record keeping
relative to dates, times, hours and rate of pay for each officer.
6.

UPD Secondary Employment Office, serving for and on behalf of UPD

off-duty officers was the sole, designated entity by which private, third-parties,
i.e. FBAC could contact and arrange for the requested and desired off-duty
police presence.
A reasonable and fair reading and examination of the Board decision and
its clearly stated adoption of the record to the Findings and Conclusion of Law
issued by ALJ Hon. Gary Gibbs. The record is absent any discussion of the
61Page
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~

direct testimony of Kenneth Hansen and his role as coordinator for UPD
Secondary Employment Office. The decision of the Board is silent as to the
mandate that all UPD officers seeking Secondary Employment must submit to,
~

apply and be accepted into said program. Likewise, Mr. Hansen provided
uncontroverted testimony as to the means and methods offered by and to UPD
off-duty officers under is "Power Detail" software program which sets standards
of for dress, dep~rtment service requirements while performing off-duty police
presence for private third parties. Having seemingly failed or ignored the
testimony of Mr. Hansen, issues relative to the guidelines set forth at Utah
Admin. Code R994-204-303, which were clearly met for and on behalf of each
respective off-duty officer by and through UPD Secondary Employment Office.

Mr. Hansen's uncontroverted testimony, as cited in Petitioner's Brief and
~

Addendum; UPD Secondary Employment Office provides, in the spirit of the
Rule, by and through its software "Power Point", what is essentially the clearing
house to meet independent contractor status which included, but not limited to
officer invoicing to private third party clients, collection
of fees, record retention relative to dates, times, hours and rate of pay for each

~

respective officer. Again, emphasizing that UPD Secondary Employment Office
clearly functions and stands for the sole benefit of UPD off-duty officers. It is

71Page
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UPD Secondary Employment Office that classifies off-duty officers as
independent contractors and not the private, individual clients, i.e. FBAC ..

~

Further in support of Petitioner's contention that the Board seemingly
failed to consider the nature of the relationship between FBAC and UPD offduty officers in the following particulars (as testified to by FBAC General
Manager Christopher Falco (as cited in Petitioner's brief with a transcript of
testimony in Petitioner's Addendum), as follows:
1.

FBAC did NOT ( emphasis added) classify UPD off-duty officers as

independent contractors, the same having been established and represented by
UPD Secondary Employment Office;
2.

FBAC had neither knowledge of nor communications with UPD off-duty

officers who provided police presence;
3.

All UPD off-duty officers, as designated independent contractors by UPD

Secondary Employment Office were assigned, supervised and reported directly
to UPD Secondary Employment and NOT (emphasis added) FBAC;
4.

FBAC had no input, control or any other indicia of employer-employee

personnel input or decision authority relative to either the services rendered as a
whole or with any single individual officers. All officers served at the sole
discretion of UPD Secondary Employment Office;
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~

5.

FBAC had no input in or access to UPD Secondary Employment software

known as "Power Detail";
6.
id

FBAC provided no direction, supervision, equipment or other indicia of

employer-employee relationship to UPD off duty officers;
7.

FBAC provided UPD off-duty officers no tools or equipment to perform

the police presence sought;
8.

UPD off-duty officers, at all relevant times to providing police presence

to FBAC and other clients were subject to an over-riding requirement to respond
to dispatch calls from their employer, UPD;
4;

9.

FBAC's sole and only contact with and contractual agreements were

made with, by and between, UPD Secondary Employment Office (as the entity
authorized to represent qualified UPD off. . duty officers;
10. FBAC would receive an invoice from UPD Secondary Employment
Office listing each off-duty officer by name and social security number for the
sole purpose of issuing payments for services rendered. All such payments were
submitted directly to UPD Secondary Employment Office for dissemination to
each respective officer having performed service; and

9f
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11. At year end, FBAC would comply with Federal law and issue the duly
authorized and accepted 1099 IRS form for each officer identified by the pay
roll records as solely submitted from UPD Secondary Employment Office.

Respondent FBAC challenges the decision of Workforce Appeals Board
for its failure to take due, fair and adequate notice of the relationship between
UPD off duty officers, the significant and sole role ofUPD Secondary
Employment Office as the only entity by which FBAC and/or any other of the
numberless third-party clients seeking police presence and security could
contract for such services, and the very clear LACK (emphasis added) of
control, input or direction from FBAC to UPD off-duty officers

In support of Petitioner's assertion that the Board failed to fairly, adequately
and reasonably consider the role of UPD Secondary Employment Office in
meeting and fulfilling the requirements set forth at §35A-4-204, UCA and Utah
Admin. Code R994-204-303 in the seminal decision issued by the Utah Supreme
Court in First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization, 799
P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990) wherein the Court held that" '[s]ubstantial evidence is
that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
10 I Page
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reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id at 1165 the Court state that the
appellate courts, when applying the substantial evidence test of the Utah
Administrative Pr~cedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) are
required to consider not only the evidence supporting the Board's findings but
also the evidence negating them. Id. See Swider, 824 P.2d at 451, Grace

Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. Respondent FBAC reaffirms its argument in its initial
Brief; UPD off duty officers compose a unique set of skilled personnel that
belies the strictures imposed under §35A-4-204 and Utah Admin. Code R994204-303 in three (3) significant and fundamental ways:

1. UPD off duty officers are precluded by law and UPD policy to employ
their highly specialized training skills and talents outside the strictures of UPD
Secondary Employment Office;
2.

UPD Secondary Employment Office provides and meets both the spirit

and letter of the law under §35A-402-204 and Utah Admin. Code R994-204~

303:
3.

Workforce Service Appeals Board did not give reasonable, fair or

~

possibly any consideration to UPD Secondary Employment Office as the entity
ensuring that UPD off duty officers were in compliance with and eligible for
independent contractor designation.
11
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CONCLUSION

Petitioner FBAC has demonstrated that the spirit and letter of both State
Statute and Administrative Rules have substantially been filled necessary to
infer independent contractor status on UPD off-duty officers. Further, Petitioner
FBAC had no input, say, control or otherwise in either the designation of UPD
off-duty officers as independent contractors and reasonably relied upon the
representation of UPD Secondary Employment Office inasmuch as said entity
was and is the only means by which UPD off-duty officers may be retained to
provide the essential police presence given the unique nature of Petitioner's
business enterprise.

DATED this 10th day of July, 2017.

Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24{0{1)

I hereby certify that:
1. This brief complies with the type volume limitation of Utah R. App. P.
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24(t)(l) because this brief contains 2,052 words, excluding the parts
of the exempted by Utah R. App. P 24(t)(l)(B).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. P. 27(b)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 13 point Times New Roman.

DATED this 10th day of July, 2017.

/s/ R. Scott Rawlings

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore going
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Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244
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824 P.2d 448 (Utah App.1991)

cJ

DEPARTMENT OF the AIR FORCE, Petitioner,

v.
Robert J. SWIDER and Department of Employment
Security, Respondents.

No. 910069-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

December 6, 1991
Page449

Dee V. Benson, Robert H. Wilde and Clare A Jones,
Midvale, for petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam and Emma R. Thomas, Salt Lake City,
for respondents.

Before JACKSON, ORME and RUSSON, JJ.
ORME, Judge:

lJ

Petitioner, the United States Air Force, challenges a
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission granting unemployment benefits to an Air
Force employee terminated for drug use. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1986, the United States Air Force adopted a "zero
tolerance" anti-drug policy for its woddbrce, and infonned
employees they could be discharged for possessing or using
illegal drugs on base, or working under the effects of such
drugs. In May of 1990, the Air Force announced plans to
supplement the policy with a comprehensive drug testing
program for all civilian employees.

From December of 1970 until May of 1990, respondent
Robert J. Swider was employed by the Air Force as an
aircraft mechanic at Hill Air Force Base. In July of 1989,
Swider spoke to Vicky Brown, a fellow employee at the
base, about frequent on-base cocaine use Swider had
observed
Page450

among bis co-workers. Brown asked Swider if she could

pass the information along to bis supervisor, a Mr.
Stevenson, and Swider agreed. Brown then engaged in a
series of conversations with Stevenson, in which she
relayed Swider's observations. As a result of his contact
with Brown, Stevenson contacted the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) and informed them of poss1l>le
on-base drug use among employees.
OSI subsequently installed surveillance cameras in
Swider's work area, and several of Swidefs co-employees
were filmed inhaling cocaine. These co•wodcers were
eventually arrested and interviewed by OSI personnel, at
which time one of them identified Swider, who had not
been shown on the videotape using drugs, as also having
used cocaine on base. In November of 1989, ·Swider
received death threats, allegedly from individuals who bad
discovered it was be who leaked information about their
drug use to OSI. Swider asked his supervisor what
protection the Air Force could offer him, and his supervisor
directed him to OSI.
Swider met with OSI agents in December of 1989. During
the course of their discussion, Swider admitted to the agents
that he had smoked marijuana while on a rafting trip in May
of 1989. He also infonned them that, subsequent to that
incident, he had been completely drug-free for eight
months. In January of 1990, Swider enrolled himself in a
30-day drug rehabilitation program. With full disclosure of
his intention to do so, he was given time off by the Air
Force to enter the program, and successfully completed it
(1)
In Febnu,uy of 1990, an OSI report was issued, concluding
that Swider's employment should be terminated because of
his off-base drug use in May of 1989. Swider was
discharged from Hill Air Force Base a full year after the
instance of drug use, in May of 1990. The next month, he
applied to the Department of Employment Security for
unemployment benefits. He was initially denied all benefits
on the ground that he had been discharged for "just cause."
[2] Swider appealed the decision to an Administrative Law
Judge (AU), who reversed the initial denial. The Air Force
then appealed to the Industrial Commission's Board of
Review, which affirmed the ALJ's decision to grant
benefits.

The Air Force now seeks our review, challenging the
Board's decision on two grounds. First, the Air Force assails
the Board's factual findings that Swider ( 1) voluntarily
reported his drug use to the OSI and (2) was insulated from
discipline because he voluntarily entered a drug
rehabilitation program. [3] Further, the Air Force challenges
the Board's determination that Swider's actions were not
"culpable" for purposes of establishing a "just cause"
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termination.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This court's review of decisions of the Board ofReview is
governed by provisions
Page4S1

of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). That
act controls judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings. and requires reversal of a Board decision
when:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the

law;

(g) the agency action is based on a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;

Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16(4) (1989).
Petitioner Air- Force first challenges the correctness of the

Board's fmdings of fact. In accordance with the mandate
just quoted, this comt grants great deference to an agency's
findings, and will uphold them if they are "supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b- I6{4)(g)
(1989). See Grace Drilling Co. v. Board ofReview, 116
P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App.1989). "Substantial evidence" has
been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id.
at 68 (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110
Idaho 2S7, 71S P.2d 927, 930 (1985)). In applying the
substantial evidence test, we review the "whole record"
before the co~ and consider both evidence that supports
the Board's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from
them. Id. h is the petitioner's duty to properly present the
record, by marshaling all of the evidence supporting the
findings and showing that, despite that evidence and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the

findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. See
Heinecke v. Department ofCommerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464
(Utah App.1991); Sampson v. Richins, 110 P.2d 998, 1002
(Utah App.), cert. denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989).

conduct "affects the continuance of the employment
relationship." Utah Admin.Code R47S-Sb-102 (1990)
(defining "culpability"). In Morton Int'I, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Commn, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme
Court held that where "there is a grant of discretion to the
agency concerning the language in question, either
~ l y made in the statute or implied from the statutory
language," id. at 589, the agency is entitled to a degree of
deference such that it should be affinned if its decision is
reasonable and rational. Id. We conclude the requisite grant
of discretion was made by the Legislature to the Board, as
evidenced by the statutory language permitting a denial of
benefits where a termination is for "just cause ... if so found
by the commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-S(b)(l) (1991

Supp.) (emphasis added). See Tasters Ltd. v. Department of
Employment Sec., 819 P.2d 361, 364-66 (Utah App.1991)
(recognizing similar language to constitute express grant of
discretion); Johnson-Bowles Co.. v. Department of
Commerce, No. 900558, slip op. at 15-16, (Utah CtApp.
Nov. 29, 1991) (same). [41
ANALYSIS
This court has previously recognized the Air Force's
legitimate interest in maintaining a drug-free work
environment, and its right to enforce its "zero tolerance"
drug policy. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v.
Department ofEmployment Sec.,

Page452
786 P.2d 1361, 1364 n. 3 (Utah App.), cert. denied, United
States v. Industrial Comm'n, 19S P.2d 1138 (1990). [SJ
However, the question before us is not whether the Air
Force was, as a matter of basic employment law, within its
rights when it discharged Swider. Instead, we are asked to
decide the completely separate issue of whether the Board
could reasonably conclude Swider was not discharged for
"just cause" under the state's unemployment scheme, as
would warrant his deprivation of a terminated employee's
usual right to collect unemployment benefits. See Utah
Admin.Code R475-Sb-101 (1990). Accordingly, our
analysis is limited to a consideration of (1) whether the
Board of Review's factual findings concerning Swider's
activities while employed are supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole and (2) whether those
findings reasonably support the Board's conclusion that
Swider's discharge was not for ''just cause," due to a lack of
culpability.
I. Findings Were Supported By Substantial Evidence

The Air Force's second claim-that the Board erred in
concluding Swider was not "culpable"-turns to a
significant degree on factual findings concerning Swider's
conduct while employed, and on the extent to which we
should defer to the Board's determination. of how that

In concluding Swider was discharged without just cause for
pwposcs of his entitlement to unemployment benefits, the
Board first compared Swider's conduct with that of the
claimant in an earlier case, in which the Board had affmned
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a denial ofunemployment benefits to one of Swider's
co-workers, Dennis L. Wagstaff. The Board in the instant
proceeding found that, in the Wagstaff' matter, "the
employer had presented adequate evidence to support the
conclusion that the claimant voluntarily abused drugs while
on the Air Base, in violation of known rules which
prohibited such abuse." Further, Wagstaff "did not report
his drug usage or seek assistance to overcome the problem
of drug abuse."
The Board then distinguished between the instant case and
the Wagstaff case on two grounds, concluding that those
differences suggested a different result. First, the Board
found that while Wagstaff had not voluntarily admitted his
drug use to his employer, "the [Air Force] learned of
[Swider's] problem with drugs because the claimant himself
brought the matter to the attention of the proper
authorities." Second, the Board determined Swider had
"volunteered for and was accepted into a drug rehabilitation
program approved by the Air Force," while Wagstaff had
not, and stated that "Air Force policy provides that
employees who seek the assistance of such a rehabilitation
program and remain drug free thereafter 'will not be subject
to disciplinary action.' " Given these distinguishing facts,
the Board concluded that Swider was eligible for
unemployment benefits even though it had determined his
co-worker, Wagstaff, was not The Air Force now
challenges these two findings.
With regard to the first finding-that Swider brought his
drug use to the attention of Air Force investigatoIS-the Air
Force expressly acknowledges that "on December l, 1989,
Mr. Swider 'brought himself to the attention of the
authorities.' "Nonetheless, the Air Force attempts to
diminish the significance of Swider's admission by pointing
out that the admission occurred in December of
1989-sevcral months after the OSI investigation bad begun
bearing fruit, and one month after a co-employee had
identified Swider as an on-base cocaine user. The Air Force
speculates that, given the timing of his confession to OSI
officials, Swider only turned himself in to speed the
inevitable. Be that as it may, the Board of Review could,
nonetheless, have been impressed by the simple fact that
Swider turned himself in at all, and an admission of any
kind does distinguish Swider's conduct from that of
Wagstaff. (6) Further, the Air Force's explanation

Page 453
for Swider's admission is wholly unsubstantiated in the
record. There is no evidence to suggest Swider came
forward simply to hasten the inevitable. In fact, there was
no evidence presented that Swider even knew he had been
implicated. The Board was entitled to find that Swider came
forward to gain Air Force protection after receiving the
death threats. Because it is uncontroverted that Swider

voluntarily confessed his past drug use to OSI agents, we
uphold the Board's finding on that issue.
Second, the Air Force claims the Board wrongly
interpreted Air Force policy in finding that Swider's
voluntary enrollment in a drug rehabilitation program
protected him ftom disciplinary action. In making its
finding of disciplinary immunity, the Board relied on a May
1989 notice circulated by the Air Force to all civilian
employees at Hill Air Force Base. The notice informed
employees that a drug testing program would be
implemented no sooner than sixty days from the date of the
letter, and continued, with our emphasis:
While the Air Force cannot tolerate the use of illegal drugs,
we encourage any employee who has a substance abuse
problem to seek appropriate counseling and rehabilitation
assistance. Employees who voluntarily identify themselves
as having an illegal drug problem within the timeframcs
established by the pro~ seek counseling, or
rehabilitation, agree to a last chance agreement and refrain
ftom using illegal drugs will not be subject to disciplinary
action.

The Air Force claims that the phrase "timeframes
established by the program11 refers to the sixty-day period
between the date of the notice and the commencement of
the drug testing program. Since Swider did not come
fmwmd until some eight months after the date of the letter,
the Air Force asserts, he did not fall within the sixty-day
"window" and could therefore be disciplined. That assertion
is incorrect. The letter stated only that the program would
be implemented in a minimum of sixty days; it made no
reference to the sixty-day period being a "window" of
immunity, after which period an employee could be
terminated regardless. [7] Further, it is impossible to
reconcile the Air Force's position with the letter's statement
that the program, which was being announced
prospectively, was to establish the time frame for
disciplinary immunity. We do not understand how, when
the program was to ~mblish the time frame, the Air Force
can plausibly contend that the time frame ended before the
program was implemented. Accordingly, we reject the
challenge to the Board's finding in this regard.
For the above-mentioned reasons, we hold that there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the
Board's findings which are challenged by the Air Force in
this appeal.
II. Respondent Was Not Culpable

Ruic 475-Sb-101 of the Utah Administrative Code states
that an employee is ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits when the employee has been terminated for "just
cause," i.e., when the "job separation ... is necessary due to
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the seriousness of actual or potential harm to the employer. 11
Rule 475-Sb-102 then sets forth the three factors which
establish just cause, and which are necessary · for a
determination of ineligibility for unemployment

continued or repeated. He caused the on-base drug use of
his co-workers to be called to the attention of the proper
authorities. He also entered and completed a voluntary drug
rehabilitation program.
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insurance benefits. Those factors are: (I) knowledge on the
part of the employee as to the conduct the employer
expected, (2) conduct that was within the employee's power
and capacity to control, and (3) culpability. It is
uncontroverted that Swidds conduct satisfied the clements

Given Swider's exemplary work history, his demonstrated
desire to distance himself from drugs, and evidence
indicating Swider's past drug use was an isolated incident, it
was reasonable and rational for the Board to conclude
Swider's conduct was not sufficiently culpable to render his
termination one for "just cause" for pwposes of
adjudicating his entitlement to unemployment benefits.

ofknowledge and control. Therefore, we consider only
whether he was culpable.

CONCLUSION

Culpability is defined in Rule 475-Sb-l 02 as
the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense
as it affects continuance of the employment relationship.
The discharge must have been necessary to avoid actual or
potential harm to the employer's rightful interests. A
discharge would not be considered "necessmy" if it is not
consistent with reasonable employment practices.

There was substantial evidence in the record to support the
Board's findings of fact. Further, it was reasonable for the
Board to conclude that Swider's conduct lacked culpability,
as the term is used in the regulations of the Department of
Employment Security. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's
decision.
JACKSON and RUSSON, JI., concur.

Utah Admin.Code R475-5b-102 (1990). lndetennining if
certain conduct is culpable, Rule 475-5b-102 states:

Notes:
The wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the
context of the particular employment and how it affects the
employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of
poor judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct
will be continued or repea~ potential harm may not be
shown and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the
employee.
Id. Further, the rule emphasizes that "longevity and prior
work record are important in determining if the act or
omission is an isolated incident or a good faith error in
judgment." Id.
Swider was employed by the Air Force for almost twenty
years. During that time he received twenty awards and
commendations for his work performance, consistently
received laudatory appraisals from his superiors, and was
never subjected to discipline prior to his termination. He
acted in important additional capacities at the base, serving
as an alternate supervisor and a Haz.ardous Waste: Site
Monitor. Swider's supervisor testified that he was unaware
of any specific problem resulting from Swider's worf4 much
less from his ~oking marijuana on vacation. The
supervisor also testified that Swider's work was dependable,
and that Swider had always seemed quite capable of
performing his duties. The Board believed that, with the
exception of an isolated incident of marijuana use in May of
1989, he had been completely drug free for eight months. It
was reasonable for the Board to have concluded there was
no expectation that Swider's drug use would have been

[I] Itis not altogether clear why, ifhe bad been drug-free
for so long, Swider elected to enter a drug rehabilitation
program at this time.

[2] Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-S(b)(l) (1991 Supp.) disallows
unemployment benefits to those "discharged for just cause
... if so found by the commission."
[3] The Air Force also refers repeatedly to evidence of
on-base cocaine use by Swider, and questions why both the
AU and the Board of Review failed to acknowledge Swider
bad used cocaine while on base. The Air Force presumes
the incriminating evidence was improperly excluded as
hearsay, and claims it should have been admitted as an
admission by a party opponent under Utah R.Evid.
80l(d)(2). We agree that at least some of the inculpatOiy
evidence falls within the scope of Rule 80l(d)(2), but do
not agree it was excluded for evidentiary reasons. Instead, it
appears the ALI and Board decided not to believe it The
AU stated that "(t]he evidence in this case is in dispute as
to whether or not the claimant actually used a controlled
substance on Hill Air Force Base premises. The Air Force
Office of Special Investigations Report contained some
discrepancies as far as dates and informational data. The
claimant emphatically denies using cocaine on the
employer's premises. n The AU and Board were not
obligated to credit the OSI report or third-perso~ testimony
over Swider's own testimony; they were free to believe
Swider, as they apparently did. See Hurley v. Board of
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Review, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988) (an agency's
findings of fact are accorded substantial deference, and
"will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence,
even if another conclusion from the evidence is
pennissible").

4'

[4] Prior to Morton Int'I, we would also have concluded the
Board's decision was entitled to this same degree of
deference but would have reached that conclusion by
focusing more on the Board's expertise and experience than
on the nature ofthe Legislature's grant of authority to the
Board. See, e.g., Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775
P.2d432, 434 (Utah App.1989) (when an agency decision
involves application of the relevant rules of Jaw to the facts,
"a [reviewing] court should afford great deference to the
technical expertise or ~ore extensive experience of the
responsible agency11) ( quoting Department of Admin. Servs.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 6S8 P.2d 601,610 (Utah 1983)).
[5] The Air Force's interest has been deemed "especially
imperative" where its employees are engaged in sensitive,
highly technical tasks, such as assembling or repairing jet
aircraft. See Department of Air Force, 786 P.2d at 1364.
See also Johnson v. Depar1ment of Employment Sec., 782
P.2d 965, 972 (Utah App.1989) (Orme, J., concuaing) (a
government contractor constructing national defense
products "is entitled to insist, in an aggressive and
uncompromising way, on an absolutely drug-free workforce
and not merely a drug-free workplace ").
[6] Moreover, the Board may have been impressed by
Swiders prior disclosure to Brown of cocaine use in his
work area, and his express authorization that she pass the
information along to his supervisor. Although, by
emphasizing that Swider turned himself in, the Board's
finding does not appear to place any significance on his
"whistle-blowing, the clear causal link would not have
escaped the Board's attention. The "whistle-blowing" led to
the death threats, which led to Swiders referral to OSI,
which led to his disclosure to OSI that he had smoked
marijuana while on vacation some mon~ previous.
11

[7] Additional language in the letter supports this position:
However, if an employee is otherwise determined to use
illegal drugs, he or she will be subject to disciplinary action,
including possible removal from Federal service. Once this
program is implemented, removal action will be proposed
for any employee receiving a second positive [urine] test,
refusing to obtain counseling or rehabilitation after being
found to use illegal drugs, or adulterating or substituting a
[urine] specimen.
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market value was $4.7 million. On April 28, 1989, the Tax
Commission entered its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, determining that the fair market value of the property
was $4,200,000.
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799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990)
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON, Petitioner,

v.
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF SALT
LAKE COUNTY, State of

Utah; Utah State Tax Commission, Respondents.

The Tax Commission calculated the fair market assessment
value of the property by using the income approach to value
method. Elements of the mcome approach to value included
the following formula and data presented at the fonnal
hearing:

1. $14 per square foot less an adjustment for free rent, or
$11.67 per square foot;

2. capitalization rate of l 0.9 percent;

No. 890278.
Supreme Court of Utah.

3. an expense ratio of 25 percent; [ 1]
4. a stabilized vacancy rate of 10 percent; and

October 16, 1990

S. the area si7.e of the building, which is 58,252 square feet.
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J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Bill Thomas Peters, Salt Lake City, for County Bd. of
Equalization.
R. Paul Van Dam. Brian L. Tarbe~ Salt Lake City, for Tax
Com'n.

Although the expense ratio is disputed, the formula for the
calculation of the assessment is not in dispute: 58,252 total
sq. ft. X 11.67 effective rent - 10% vacancy rate - $170,095
expenses (25% expense ratio) (disputed figure) / 10.9%
capitali7.ation rate = $4,200,000 taxable amount The Tax
Commission arrived at a final taxable
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HALL, Chief Justice:
This case is a review of an order of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Tax Commission") setting the assessment on
property owned by First National Bank ofBoston ("First
National") and from a denial ofFirst National's request for
reconsideration. First National challenges the accuracy of
the Tax Commission's finding that the expense ratio on the
property is 25 percent
The property at issue in this case is an office building
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, and subject to assessment
by Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § '
59-2-301 (1987). Salt Lake County assessed the property at
$5,176,440 for the year 1987. First National appealed the
assessment to the Salt Lake County Board ofEqualiz.ation
11
( Board of Equalization"), which adjusted the value of the
property to $4,580,850 based on evidence presented at the
hearing.
First National appealed the decision of the Board of
Equalization to the Tax Commission. At a fonnal hearing
before the Tax Commission, First National asserted that the
fair market value of the property was approximately $3. 7
million. Salt Lake County contended that the property's fair

amount of$4,200,000 by using the 25 percent expense
ratio. [2] First National calculated the taxable amount to be
$3,690,429 by using a 31 percent expense ratio. [3]
The only issue for review is the. accuracy of the Tax
Commissions findings of fact, specifically, whether the Tax
Commission erred in calculating the expense ratio portion
of the formula at 25 percent. The other elements of the
formula are not in dispute.
The Administrative Procedures Act (4] governs our review
of the Tax Commission's assessment Section 63-46b-l6(4)
states:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agencys record, it determines that a person
seckingjudicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
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The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise
the tax laws of the State. It shall assess mines and public
utilities and adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of property among the several counties. It shall
have such other powers of original assessment as the
Legislature may provide. Under such regulations in such
cases and within such limitations as the Legislature may
prescribe, it shall review proposed bond issues, revise the
tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the
assessment and valuation of property within the counties.
The duties imposed upon the State Board of Equalimtion by
the Constitution and Laws of this State· shall be perfonned
by the State Tax Commission.

[IO] Utah Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, S90
P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979).
[11) Hurley v. Board of Review oflndus. Comm'n, 767
P.2d 524, 526-27 {Utah 1988); Utah Power & Light, 590
P2dat33S.

In each county of this State there shall be a County Board
of Equalization consisting of the Board of County
Commissioners of said county. The County Boards of
Equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of the real and personal property within their
respective counties, subject to such regulation and control
by the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed by law.
The State Tax Commission and the County Boards of
Equalization shall each have such other powers as may be
prescribed by the Legislature.
[9] Section 59-1-210 states in pertinent part:

The powers and duties of the commission are as follows:

(7) to exercise supervision over assessors and county
boards of equalization, and over other county officers in the
perfonnance of their duties relating to the assessment of
property and collection of tax~ so that all assessments of
property are just and equal, according to fair market value,
and that the tax burden is distnlmtcd without favor or
discrimination;

...,
(23) to correct any em>r in any assessment made by it at
any time before the tax is due and report the correction to
the county auditor, who shall enter the corrected assessment
upon the assessment roll;

(25) to perform any further duties imposed by law, and
exercise all powers necessary in the performance of its
duties;

(27) to comply with the procedures and requirements of
Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings.
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record before the court

We remand for the purpose of requmng the Tax
Commission to more fully articulate the basis for its
findings and determination of fair market value in light of
the evidence presented in the hearing.

Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) requires an appellate court to
review the 11whole record" to determine whether the
agency's action is "supported by substantial evidence."
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion. [5] An appellate court
applying the "substantial evidence testn must consider both
the evidence that supports the Tax Commission's factual
findings and the evidence that detracts from the findings.
(6] Nevertheless, the party challenging the findings-in this
case, the taxpayer-must marshal all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts, the Tax Commission's findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. [7]

HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

Notes:
[1] The expense ratio is calculated by dividing the square
foot expense figure, in this case, $3.47 per square foot, by
the income from rental rates, $14 per square foot face rate
($11.67 per square foot when adjusted for free rent given as
inducements or incentives to tenants).
[2] The method the Tax Commission used to arrive at the
$4,200,000 figure is unclear; however, if some of the
figures contained in the findings of fact are used, the
calculation would be as follows: 58,252 sq. ft. X $11.67
(679,800.84) - 10% vacancy rate (67,980.08) -$170,095
expenses / 10.9% capitalization rate·= $4,052,529.9.
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission valued th~ property at
$4,200,000.

Nothing in the record indicates how the Tax Commission
arrived at the figures for expenses and the 25 percent
expense ratio. First National has presented expense figures
that. were entered into evidence and has explained how
those figures fit into the formula to arrive at the $3,690,429
fair market value.
Despite the fact that both parties presented evidence of
expense figures significantly higher than the Tax
Commission's fmdings, the Board o(Equalization and the
Tax Commission argue that the Tax Commission is not
bound by the evidence presented by either party but may
make findings of its own. They base their argument upon
the broad grant of authority bestowed upon the Tax
Commission in the Utah Constitution [8] and Utah Code
Annotated. (9]

(3) The figures used by First National are as follows:
58,252 X $11.67 (679,800.84) - 10% vacancy rate
(67,980.08) -$209,564 expenses (31% expense ratio) /
10.9% capitali7.ation rate =$3,690,429 taxable amount
(4) Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989).
(5] See Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018,
1026-27, 16 L.Ed.2d i31 (1966); Idaho State Ins. Fund v.
Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930-31 (1985);
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah
Ct.App.1989).
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Nowhere in the Utah Constitution or Utah Code Annotated
does the legislature give the Tax Commission the unbridled
discretion to make findings of fact beyond the scope of
what is presented in the hearings or inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Although it is a "universally recognized rule"
that this court must "take some cognizance of the expertise
of the agency in its particular field and accordingly to give
some deference to its determination," (10] the agency's
decision must rest upon some sound evidentiary basis, not a
creation of fiat [Ill
It is unclear from the record how the Tax Commission
arrived at the figures it used in calculating the fair market
value of petitioner's property. First National has upheld its
burden to marshal all of the evidence in support of the Tax
Commission's findings and has shown that on the record
before us those findings are inconsistent with the evidence
presented.

'

[6) See Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. We note that prior
to the repeal ofUtah Code Ann. § 54.7-16 (1953) and the
enactment of section 63-46b-16 (1989), an appellate court's
review of an agency's findings of fact was limited to
reversin~ only when the findings were arbitrary and
capricious and nwitbout foundation in fact." The agency's
findings would be upheld if there was evidence of any
substance whatever which could reasonably be regarded as
supporting the finding. See, e.g., Utah Dep't of Admin.
Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 608-09 (Utah
1983).
[7] See Comish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah
1988); Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
(8] Article XIII, section 11 states in pertinent part:
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manual and the consent forms signed by Mr. Goodale
clearly stated that testing positive on a drug screen while on
duty was cause for discharge. Mr. Goodale acknowledged
that he had read and understood the manual; drug policy,
and consent fonn.
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776 P.2d 63 (Utah App.1989)
GRACE DRILLING COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF
COMMISSION OF UTAH,

the

INDUSTRIAL

Department of Employment Security, and Gordon E.

Goodale, Respondents.
No. 880S72-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

June 2, 1989
Page64
Frederick M. MacDonald, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
R. Paul Van Dam and Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
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Before BILLINGS, GARFF, and JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Petitioner Grace Drilling Company appeals from the
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission ("Board") awarding Gordon E. Goodale
unemployment compensation benefits. The Board
concluded Mr. Goodale was not discharged from his
employment for disqualifying conduct under Utah Code
Ann. § 35-4-S(b)(I) (1988). We affinn the Board's
detennination.
FACTS

vo

We review only those facts relevant to the issues presented.
In January 1988, Mr. Goodale was hired by Grace Drilling
to work as a foreman on two of its oil drilling rigs in Uintah
County, Utah. As a condition of employment, Mr. Goodale
agreed to abide by Grace Drilling's safety manual, work
rules, and regulations. Mr. Goodale also consented to
submit to random drug testing. Both Grace Drilling's safety

While at work on March 17, 1988, Mr. Goodale was
randomly selected for drug testing. He voluntarily
submitted a urine sample and executed another consent
form. On the form, Mr. Goodale disclosed that he had been
taking Advil within the past seven days. Mr. Goodale also
verbally informed his supervisor that he lwl been taking
two prescription drugs for lower back pain, the names of
which he could not recall. He offered to go home to retrieve
the names of the drugs, but Mr. Goodale's supervisor
informed him that it was unnecessary. Instead, the
supervisor informed Mr. Goodale that if the test results
were positive, he would be given an opportunity to present
the names of the other two drugs for Grace Drilling to
consider. The drug test was conducted and Mr. Goodale's
urine sample t ~ positive for marijuana. Mr. Goodale
was discharged on March 24, 1988, without being given an
opportunity to provi4e the names of the two prescription
drugs he told his supervisor he had been using prior to the
drug test
Mr. Goodale filed for and was awarded unemployment
benefits. Grace Drilling appealed the Department of
Employment Security's initial detennination by notice dated
May 12, 1988. At the administrative hearing, Grace
Drilling's representative bad no personal knowledge of Mr.
Ooodale's drug test or the circumstances surrounding his
discharge. Furthermore, the written test results were not
offered into evidence, and Grace Drilling failed to call any
witness who had administered the test or who was
otherwise familiar with the testing procedures. Instead,
Grace Drilling's representative merely testified as to what
she had been told by others about Mr. Goodale's test results.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeal referee
requested further information, including a copy of the test
results which Grace Drilling agreed to provide. The record
was left open for this purpose. However, Grace Drilling
later advised the appeal referee that it would not provide the
test report. Accordingly, the appeal referee affirmed the
Department of Employment Security's initial disposition
awarding Mr. Goodale benefits based on the available
evidence in the record. Specifically, the appeal referee
found that Grace Drilling failed to provide sufficient
foundation to support the validity of a positive test result,
and its hearsay testimony that Mr. Goodale tested positive
was contested by sworn testimony. The appeal referee also
found that Grace Drilling refused to verify the positive test
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result or offer evidence negating the possibility that the
prescription drugs reportedly taken by Mr. Goodale could
have affected the outcome of the test Accordingly, since no
other reasons were given by Grace Drilling for terminating
Mr. Goodale, the appeal referee concluded that he was
entitled to unemployment benefits.
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Following the appeal referee's decision, Grace Drilling
filed its appeal and submitted to the Board the writteo test
report originally requested by the appeal referee. The Board
refused to accept the proffered report stating that "[t]o
consider such evidence would deny the claimant due
process by depriving him of the right to challenge and rebut
the information contained therein." The Board further
concluded the appeal referee's decision was a correct
application of the Utah Employment Security Act,
supported by competent evidence, and therefore, affirmed
the award of unemployment compensation benefits to Mr.
Goodale.
Grace Drilling raises two issues in this appeal claiming, (1)
there is substantial evidence that Mr. Goodale was
terminated for just cause because he tested positive for drug
use while on duty, and (2) the Board abused its discrelion in
refusing to consider the proffered test results.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER THE UfAH

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
These proceedings were commenced after Janwuy 1, 1988,
and thus our review is governed by Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act ("UAPA"). [1] Section 63-46b-16(4) governs judicial
review of fonnal adjudicative proceedings and provides:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of
the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of
the following:.
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred
by any statute;

(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;

procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:

(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;

(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Grace Drilling claims the Board's findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence as required under §
63-46b-16(4)(g). No reported Utah case to date has direcdy
addressed whether the UAPA modifies the standard for
reviewing the Board's findings of fact previously utilized
Page67

by Utah courts. Thus, the issue is one of first impression.
Standard for Reviewing the Board's Factual Findings Prior
totheUAPA
Prior to the UAPA, the standards for reviewing
administrative agency proceedings on appeal were a
combination of specific statutory provisions governing
judicial review of particular agency determinations,
interpreted in light of "established principles governing
judicial review of administrative agencies generally." See
Utah Dep't ofAdmin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 658
P.2d 601, 607 (Utah 1983).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-I0{i) (1988) (superseded by §
63-46b•l6(4)(g)) set forth the standard for reviewing the
Board's findings of fact and provided in relevant part:

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;

In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings
of the commission and the board of review as to the facts if
supported by evidence, are conclusive and the jurisdiction
of the court is confined to questions oflaw.

(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed

One of the earlier Utah Supreme Court decisions
interpreting this provision held the Board's findings of fact
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will be affirmed "if there is evidence of any substance
whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting
the detennination made...." Kennecott Copper Corp.
Employees v. Department of Employment Sec., 13 Utah 2d
262, 372 P.2d 987, 989 (1962). This standard has been
followed on a number of occasions, including the Utah
Supreme Court's landmark pronouncements concerning
judicial review of administrative proceedings in Utah Dep't

ofAdmin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601,
607-12 (Utah 1983). In Administrative Services, the court
stated in dicta, "in reviewing decisions on unemployment
compensation ... we have declared that we will sustain the
findings of the Board if 'there is evidence of any substance
whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting
the determination made....' " Id. at 609 (quoting Kenn~ott
Copper, 372 P.2d at 989) (emphasis in original). [2]

but also the evidence that 11 fairly detracts from the weight of
the [Board's] evidence." [7] It is also important to note that
the "whole record test" necessarily requires that a party
challenging the Board's findings of fact must marshall all of
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting ~ and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. Cf. Comish Town v. Koller, 158 P.2d
919,922 (Utah 1988) (to mount an attack on a trial court's
findings of fact "an appellant must marsball the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings"). See also Sampson v.
Richins, 110 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct.App.1989).

However, there are also a number of Utah decisions that,
without elaboration, have used different terminology in
discussing the applicable standard for reviewing the Board's
ftndings offset For example, in Northwest Foods Ltd. v.
Board of Review, 731 P.2d 470,471 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court declared that the Board's findings of fact
"are conclusive and binding, and are to be sustained if
supported by competent and substantial evidence in the
record." (3]

In undertaking such a review, this court will not substitute
its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views,
even though we may have come to a different conclusion
had the case ,come before us for de novo review. See
Thompson v. Wake County Bd. ofEduc., 292 N.C. 406, 233
S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977). Cf. Stegen v. Department of
Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160, 1163 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). It is the province of the Board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same
evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences. Board
ofEduc. ofMontgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md 22,
491 A.2d 1186, 1193 (1985).

Notwithstanding these variations in terminology, under the

TERMINATION FOR CAUSE

UAPA, it is clear that the Board's findings of fact will be
affinned only if they are "supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.11

The Board concluded Grace Drilling failed to meet its
burden of establishing

Utah Code Ann.§ 63•46b-16(4)(g) (1988). This "substantial
evidence test" grants appellate courts greater latitude in
reviewing the record than was previously granted under the
Utah Employment Security Act's 11any evidence of
substance test. ..
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UAPA's "Substantial Evidence" Test [4]
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of
evidence ... though 'something less than the weight of the
evidence.' 11 Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho
257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985) (quoting Consolo v. FMC,
383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, l026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131
(1966)). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.' 11 Id. [S]

In applying the "substantial evidence test," we review the
"whole record" before the court, and this review is
distinguishable "from both a de novo review and the 'any
competent evidence' standard of review." [ 6] Moreover,
under the "whole record test," a court must consider not
only the evidence supporting the Board's factual findings,
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Mr. Goodale was terminated from his employment for just
cause as it did not establish he tested positive for drug use
while on duty. Grace Drilling argues it met its burden
through the proper application of Utah Code Ann. §
34-38-10(2)(a) (1988), which creates a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the employer that drug test results
are valid so long as certain testing procedure criteria are met
as specified in § 34-38-6. [8] For pmposes of discussion,
we assume without deciding that the Utah Drug and
Alcohol Testing statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-38-1 to -15
(1988), applies to administrative hearings such as the one
before us, but nevertheless, we find Grace Drilling's
reliance on its provisions misguided.
Grace Drilling argues that it complied with the statutory
requirements and therefore, Mr. Goodale was terminated for
cause because he failed to rebut the presumption that he
tested positive for marijuana while on duty. However, based
on the Board's findings of fact, Grace Drilling failed to
demonsttate that its testing procedures met the enumerated
criteria set forth in§ 34•38-6. For example,§ 34-38-6(3)(b)
requires that an employee be given an opportunity to
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provide information concerning any prescription drugs
presently or previously taken. The Board found that at the
time Mr. Goodale was tested, he was using two unidentified
prescription drugs and was not given an opportunity to
identify the drugs before he was discharged.

More importantly, Grace Drilling failed to demonstrate that
its testing procedures "conform[ed] to scientifically
accepted analyti~ methods and procedures.• See §
34-38-6(5). The only testimony offered by Grace Drilling to
meet the statutory requirement was the hearsay testimony of
its office manager who admitted she had no personal
knowledge of the testing procedures or test results, and
who, therefore, clearly was not qualified to provide the
necessary foundation for receiving the positive test results
into evidence. Conversely, Mr. Goodale's sworn testimony
states that he had not used marijuana while working for
Grace Drilling and that he had been taking two unknown
prescription drugs which conceivably could have affected
the test results.
In sum, there was simply no competent evidence before the
Board entitling Grace Drilling to the statutory presumption.
Neither was there competent evidence demonstrating that
Mr. Goodale tested positive for marijuana while on duty.
The office manager's hearsay testimony, standing alone,
could not provide a basis to establish Mr. Goodale tested
positive. See, e.g., Mayes v. Department a/Employment
Sec., 754 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah CLApp.1988) (findings
cannot be based entirely on hearsay evidence).
Accordingly, we find no error in refusing to grant Grace
Drilling the statutory presumption set forth in §
34-38-10(2)(a). In the absence of any

First, it is undisputed that Mr. Goodale was discharged
solely because he tested positive for illegal drugs while on
duty. It reasonably follows that the test results were crucial
to Grace Drilling's burden of establishing that Mr. Goodale
was discharged for "just cause." Grace Drilling was given
two opportunities to present the results and lay the
appropriate foundation for receiving them into evidence.
Grace Drilling declined on both occasions, and its
post-hearing confidentiality justification simply is not
persuasive as the appeal referee could have taken the
appropriate precautions to protect the confidentiality of the
report.
In short, the test results were clearly available at the time of
the hearing and the Board so noted. The Board declined to
consider the test results stating to do so would have
deprived Mr. Goodale of the opportunity to rebut or
cross-examine. We agree. Elementary fairness in
unemployment compensation adjudications includes a
party's right to see adverse evidence and be afforded an
opportunity to rebut such evidence. See, e.g., Lanier-Brugh,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Utah
CtApp.1988). Grace Drilling argues that Mr. Goodale
could be ·given an opportunity to challenge the results if the
matter were merely remanded to the appeal referee to take
additional evidence. However, we do not believe granting
parties "three bites at the apple11 is consonant with efficient
administrative procedure. Grace Drilling had ample
opportunity to present its case and failed to meet its bmden.
We hold the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
consider the test results.

Based on the foregoing, the Board's order granting Mr.
Goodale unemployment compensation benefits is affirmed.
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GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
competent evidence demonstrating that Mr. Ooodale tested
positive for marijuana while on duty, and in light of Mr.
Goodale's sworn testimony to the contrary, the Board's
conclusion that Mr. Goodale was not terminated for
disqualifying conduct under the Employment Security Act
is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
COMMISSION'S
REFUSAL
PROFFERED TEST RESULTS

TO

CONSIDER

We next address Grace Drilling's claim the Board abused
its discretion [9] in refusing to reopen the record to consider
the proffered test results which allegedly demonstrated that
Mr. Goodale had tested positive for marijuana. Grace
Drilling concedes it refused to submit the test results at the
administrative bearing but claims it was trying to avoid
confidentiality problems and protect Mr. Goodale's privacy
interests. We are not persuaded by Grace Drilling's
argument.

Notes:
[I] See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-461>--1 to -22 (1988 Supp.).
Section 63-46b-22(1) provides that the UAPA applies to
"all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or
before an agency on or after January I, 1988.... "
Additionally,§ 63-46b-l(l)(b) provides, with our emphasis,
that the UAPA governs judicial review of agency actions
"[e]xcept as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of
[UAPA] by explicit reference to [UAPA].... " The Utah
Employment Security Act has no such superseding
provisions concerning judicial review, and therefore OW"
review is governed by§ 63-46b-16(4). We also note that the
UAPA is substantially similar to the Uniform Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (1981), 14 U.L.A 69 (1988)
f'MSAPA"). See Utah A.P.A 1988-89, comments of the
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than "some" evidence test).

Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee at 10 (April
25, 1988). Specifically, § 63-46b--16(4)(a)-(h) "are
patterned after the comparable provisions in the MSAPA
(Sections S-116(c)(l) through 5-116(c){8))." Utah
A.P.A.1988-89, supra, at 15.

[7] Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541. See also, e.g., Seven
Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n,
450 A.2d 475, 479 (Me.1982); Beebee v. Haslett Pub.
Schools, 406 Mich. 224, 278 N.W.2d 37, 39-40 (1979);
Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 306
N.C. 231,293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982).

[2] See also, e.g., West Jordan v. Department of
Employment Sec., 6S6 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1982) (fmdings
of met are ~nclusive "if supported by evidence of any
substance"); Taylor v. Department of Employment Sec.,
647 P.2d 1, 1 {Utah 1982). Accord Grinnell v. Board of
Review, 732 P.2d 113, llS (Utah 1987) (per curiam);
Terminal Scrv. Co. v. Board of Review, 714 P.2d 298,299
{Utah 1986) (per curiam); Mayes v. Department of
Employment Sec., 754 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah CLApp.1988);
Tun Whetton Buick v. Department of Employment Sec.,
7S2 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Stegen v.
Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160, 1162
(Utah Ct.App.1988).
[3] See also, e.g., Covington v. Board of Review, 737 P.2d
207; 209 {Utah 1987) (findings must be supported by
"substantial evidence''); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department
ofEmployment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah 1982);
Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec.• 151 P.2d 1160,
1163 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (we affirm Board's findings if
they have "substantial support in the record," citing
Northwest Foods, 731. P.2d at 471); Chrysler Dodge
Country v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 278,
281 (Utah CtApp.1988).
[4] See, supra, note 1. In the absence ofUtah authority
inteipreting provisions of the MSAPA, we turn to those
jurisdictions with similar provisions for guidance.

[5] See also Hockaday v. D.C. Dep't ofEmployment
Servs., 443 A2d 8, 12 (D.C.1982); Board of Educ. of
Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 491 A.2d
1186, 1193 (1985); Wright v. State Real Estate Comm'n,
208 Neb. 467, 304 N.W.2d 39, 44 (1981); Cook v.
Employment Div., 47 Or.App. 437, 614 P.2d 1193, 1195
(1980); Sweet v. State Technical Inst. atMemphis, 617
S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tenn.Ct.App.1981); Roberts v.
Employment Sec. Comm'n ofWyoming, 745 P.2d 1355,
1357 (Wyo.1987).
[6] Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C.
406,233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977) (citing Universal Camera
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.O. 456, 95 L.Ed.
456 (19S1)). Accord Guntharp v. Cobb County, Georgia,
168 Ga.App. 33, 307 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1983) (decision
supported by some or any evidence rule does not mean the
decision was supported by "substantial evidence"); Midstate
Oil Co. v. Missouri· Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S. W.2d
842, 846 (Mo.1984) (substantial evidence test is different

This requirement most distinguishes the "substantial
evidence test" from the "any evidence rule." Under the

~

latter test, a court's limited review was qualitative in that it
only considered whether there was any competent evidence
in the reconl supporting the Board's determination. In
essence, courts reviewed only that portion of the record
supporting the Board's findings. In contrast, the "substantial
evidence test11 is both a qualitative and "quantitative"
inquiry. We now review both sides of the record to
detennine whether the Board's findings are supported by
substantial evidence. See generally In re Southview
Presbyterian Church, 62 N.C.App. 45, 302 S.E.2d 298, 299
(1983) (substantial evidence test requites court to consider
contradictory evidence, and the evidence required to
support agency determination "is greater than that required
under the 'any competent evidence' standard of review").

[8] Section 34-38-6, entitled "Requirements for collection
and testing," provides as follows:
All sample collection and testing for drugs and alcohol
under this chapter shall be performed in accordance with
the following conditions:
(1) The collection of samples shall be performed under
reasonable and sanitary conditions;
(2) Samples shall be collected and tested with due regard to
the privacy of the individual being tested, and in a manner
reasonably calculated to prevent substitutions or
interference with the collection or testing of reliable
samples;
(3) Sample collection shall be documented, and the
documentation procedures shall include:
(a) labeling of samples so as reasonably to preclude the
probability of erroneous identification of test results; and
(b) an opportunity for the employee or prospective
employee to provide notification of any information which
he considers relevant to the test, including identification of
currently or recently used prescription or nonprescription
drugs, or other relevant medical information.
(4) Sample collection, storage, and transportation to the
place of testing shall be performed so as reasonably to
preclude the probability of sample contamination or
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adulteration; and
(S) Sample testing shall conform to scientifically accepted
analytical methods and procedures. Testing shall include
verification or confnmation of any positive test result by
gas
cbromotography-mass
gas
chromotography,
spectroscopy, or other comparably reliable analytical
method, before the result of any test may be used as a basis
for any action by an employer under Section 34-38-8.

~

[9] Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1988)
with UtahAdmin R. 475-l0d-3(2) (1987-88).

~
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site, or " contract landmen,11 performing most of their duties
out in the field and at local courthouses. This case calls into
question whether Elliot was a company landman or a
contract landman.

Page 107
197 P.3d 107 (Utah App. 2008)

October 30, 2008

1 3 Prior to working for Petro-Hunt, Elliot performed
landman services for two other companies, Hingeline Land
and Title (Hingeline) and Bowman and Associates
(Bowman). Bowman had·cootracted to provide land.man
services for Petro-Hunt; however, in September 2005,
Petro-Hunt ·canceled the Bowman contract At
approximately the same time, Petro-Hunt hired several of
Bowman's employees, including Elliot Elliot was
specifically hired by Petro-Hunt to work on the Paradise
Leases, an endeavor that was projected to last one year.fl]
Under the terms of her contract with Petro-Hunt, Elliot
received $200 per day in compensation, $15 per day as a
per diem, and 44.5¢ per mile for all miles driven with her
personal car. The contract categorized Elliot as a broker and
independent contractor, and contained confidentiality
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and non-compete clauses. Petro-Hunt did not withhold any
taxes for Elliot and provided her with I099 independent
contractor tax forms.
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Before Judges GREENWOOD, BENC~ and BILLINGS.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

lJ)

'J 1 Petitioner Petro-Hunt, LLC (Petro-Hunt) appeals the
Workforce Appeals Board's (Appeals Boant) conclusion
that Bambi Elliot was a Petro-Hunt employee, not an
independent contractor, and her wages are therefore subject
to unemployment insurance taxes. We affirm.
BACKGROUND

l.w>

~

,I 2 Elliot worked for Petro-Hunt, an oil and gas exploration
company, from approximately September 200S to January
2006. While working for Petro-Hunt, Elliot " generally
performed work that fit within the duties oflandmen." In
the oil and gas industry, landmen typically assist companies
with acquiring land and mineral leases, performing due
diligence on those leases, and performing other
lease-related assignments. Landmen can be company ·
employees, conducting most of their work at the company ·

,i 4 As part of her responsibilities for Petro-Hunt, Elliot
was expected to perform due diligence on the Paradise
Leases. She reviewed lease title documents and records,
completed data entry, compiled reports and spreadsheets,
filed documents, made copies, and answered phones and
emails. She worked in the company's office in Ephraim,
Utah, during regular business hours, working appro~ly
forty to sixty hours a week. To complete her assignments,
Elliot worked primarily from her own laptop computer, on
which she " assimilated, consolidated, and organized the
data and reports submitted by the field landmen." While she
was with Petro-Hunt, Elliot did not advertise her services
and she " did not indicate she wished to obtain any other
clients because she was working full-time for Petro-Huntti
,i 5 At the close of the Paradise Leases project, in January
2007, Elliot was released from her employment with
Petro-Hunt She worked for Baseline, another oil and gas
company, for approximately three months, then filed for
unemployment compensation in April 2007. Robert
Goodwin, a field auditor for the Utah Department of
Workforce Services, investigated the status of Elliot's
employment, and in the spring of 2007, concluded that
Elliot " performed a personal service for Petro-Hunt," the
service she provided constituted " covered employment,"
and, thus, Petro-Hunt was required to pay unemployment
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insurance taxes for the wages it bad paid to Elliot.

because the Appeals Board refused

11 6 Petro-Hunt appealed Goodwin's decision, and on
September 6, 2007, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
presided over a hearing on the matter. Two days prior to the
hearing, Petro,.Hunt filed a motion seeking a continuance
and permission to conduct discovery " in the form of
interrogatories, requests for the production of documents
and a deposition of [Elliot]." The AU denied Petro-Hunt's
motion and proceeded with the hearing.
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1 7 After the September hearing, the ALJ issued findings of
fact and conclusions of law, in which she determined that
Elliot provided covered employment services for
Petro-Hunt and, accordingly, the wages Petro-Hunt paid to
Elliot were subject to unemployment insurance taxes.
Petro-Hunt appealed the AU's decision to the Appeals
Board. After additional briefing, the Appeals Board
unanimously affirmed the ALJ's decision. Petro-Hunt
appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

'IJ 8 Petro-Hunt argues that by denying its motion for fonnal
discovery and a continuance, the Appeals Board violated its
right to due process " and [its] ability to prepare and
conduct a defense." While Petro-Hunt categorizes this
discovery issue as a constitutional question, the proper
standard of review for the Appeals Board's discovery ruling
is abuse of discretion. See Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403
(Supp.2008) (stating that appellate court shall grant relief if.
among other reasons, " the agency action is •.. an abuse of
the discretion delegated to the agency by statute" ); cf.Salt
Lake Citizens Congress v. Mowitain States Tel. & Tei. Co.,
846 P.2d 1245, 1255 (Utah 1992) (holding that
administrative agency II acted mbitrarily and capriciously in
denying petitioners' request for discovery" ).
119 Petro-Hunt also asserts that the Appeals Board erred by
refusing to adopt Texas law that classifies landmen as
independent conlractors and by failing to properly apply "

principles of Utah law" regarding independent contractor
professions. And finally, Petro-Hunt challenges the Appeals
Board's ultimate conclusion that Elliot was a Petro-Hunt
employee as opposed to an independent contractor. " This
court will reverse the Board's ultimate determination [on
whether Elliot was an employee or an independent
contractor], and upset its intermediate conclusions, only if
we conclude they are irrational or unreasonable." Tasters
Ltd., v. Department a/Employment Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 19
(Utah Ct.App.1993).
ANALYSIS
I. Due Process

1

10 Petro-Hunt argues that it was denied due process

to allow it the opportunity to conduct fonnal discovery. Its
argument is based on the following two principles: First,
that entities subject to an administrative hearing have " a
due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair
tn"bunal," and second, that " the modem rules of civil
procedure were developed and subsequendy adopted by
each level of the judiciary from federal and state courts to
administrative agencies. " (Emphasis added.) As diacusscd.
below, neither of these two principles support Petro-Hunt's
assertion of error.

1 11 While it is true that " every person who brings a claim
... at a hearing held before an administrative agency bas a
due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair
tribunal," Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331,
1333 (Utah 1987), we cannot say that this fairness
requirement necessarily includes a constitutional right to
formal discovery in administrative proceedings. Cf.Salt
Lau Citizens Congress, 846 P.2d at 1255 (holding that
administrative agency " acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying petitioners' request for discovery" ). But seeSims v.
National Transp. Safety Bd., 662 F.2d 668, 671-72 (10th
Cir.1981) (noting that some "[c]ircuits have expressed the
view that judicially reversible unfairness may result from a
denial of discovery" ). " At a m ~ " the procedural
fairness mandate requires "' [t]imely ~d adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.'" In re
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (alteration in
original) (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211
(Utah 1983)). And while due process requirements are "'
flexible and call [ ] for the procedural protections that the
given situation demands,' " id. (quoting Labrum v. Utah
State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993)), we
see no constitutional right, either implied or explici~ to
fonnal discovery in administrative proceedings.
AccordBeaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d
· 344, 3S2 (Utah 1996) (" [D]iscovery in administrative
proceedings is available only if governing statutes or
agency rules so provide."); Sims, 662 F.2d at 671 C' 'There
is no basic constitutional right to pretrial discovery in
administrative proceedings.' 11 (quoting Silverman v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th
Cir.1977))); State ex rel. Hoover v. Smith, 198 W.Va. 507,
482 S.E.2d 124, 134 (1997) (" Generally, there is no
constitutional right to pre-hearing discovery in
2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative
administrative proceedings.
Law § 327 (1994) C' There is no constitutional right to
pretrial discovery in administrative proceedings." ).
11

);

1 12 Perhaps the flaw in Petro-Hunt's argument stems from
its misconception that Utah's administrative agencies have
formally adopted the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.[2] This
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is, however, not the case. Instead, the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) provides that in formal
adjudicative proceedings, administrative agencies II may, by
rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate to pennit the
parties to obtain all relevant information necessacy to
support their claims or defenses." Utah Code Ann. §
630-4-205(1) (Supp.2008). And only if an agency chooses
not to craft its own discovery rules do the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure apply. See id. (" If the agency does not
enact rules under this section, the parties may conduct
discovery according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."
).

11 13 In this instance, it is clear that the Department of
Workforce Seivices has specifically adopted administrative
rules that govern discovery procedures for unemployment
insmance proceedings. See Utah Admin. Code
R994-508-108. Rule R994-508-108 of the Utah
Administrative Code states that formal discovery is only
appropriate in limited circumstances:
(2) The use of fonnal discovery procedures in
unemployment insurance appeals proceedings [is] rarely
necessary and tend[s] to increase costs while delaying
decisions. Formal discovery may be allowed for
unemployment insurance hearings only if so directed by the

AL.land
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when each of the following elements is present:
(a) informal discovery is inadequate to obtain the
information required;
(b) there is no other available alternative that would be less
costly or less intimidating;

(c) it is not unduly burdensome;
( d) it is necessary for the parties to properly prepare for the
hearing;and

(e) it does not cause unreasonable delays.
Id. R. R994-508-108(2) (emphasis added). Thus, in lieu of

\:JP

crafting an explicit right to formal discovery in
unemployment insurance proceedings, the Department of
Workforce Services has determined that the party
requesting formal discovery has the burden to establish that
certain factors have been met before its request will be
granted, and the Appeals Board has the discretion to
dere:,mine if the requesting party has met its burden. Based
on this statutory scheme, we conclude that there is no
constitutional right to formal discovery in unemployment
insurance proceedings.

'ii 14 Further, as Petro-Hunt conceded at oral argument, it
does not challenge this overall statutory scheme; rather, it
only challenges the Appeals Board's ultimate conclusion on
a constitutional basis. Although Petro-Hunt could have
challenged the Appeals Board's denial of formal discovery
as an abuse of discretion, it has not done so. See generally
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i) (stating relief may be
obtained if the agency has abused its discretion).
Nevertheless, in order to address the issue of fairness raised
by Petro-Hunt, we note the following. In its request for
formal discovery, Petro-Hunt cited the aforementioned rule
and then provided a bald assertion that formal discovery
was appropriate. More precisely, Petro-Hunt reiterated the
factors that must be met for fonnal discovery to be allowed
and then stated that "[e]ach of these factors is met here."
Petro-Hunt, however, failed to provide any details of how
each requirement was actually met. In spite of Petro-Hunt's
terse argument, the Appeals Board made findings on each
of the rule's requirements before concluding that formal
discovery was inappropriate. The Appeals Board
specifically concluded that: (1) "[t]here is no evidence in
the record establishing informal discovery was inadequate
to obtain the information Petro-Hunt was seeking, or that
[Elliot] was uncooperative with Petro-Hunt's informal
requests, if there were any" ; (2) " Petro-Hunt has not
shown ... that there were no other available alternatives
beyond interrogatories, requests for production, and (Elliot]
traveling to Las Vegas to have her deposition taken• ; (3)
Petro-Hunt's requests were costly and intimidating, would
have significantly delayed the hearing, and been unduly
burdensome for Elliot, " especially ... considering that
[Elliot] received Petro-Hunt's discovery requests" only a
few days before the scheduled bearing; (4) Elliot bad
testified regarding all of the factors used to determine if she
was an employee· or an independent contractor and there
wasno evidence presented to indicate that she had lied; (S)
although Petro-Hunt was requesting Elliot's tax returns, the
ALJ had already requested the same, and Elliot testified that
she could not find them, thus, formal requests for the
returns were not likely to have produced a different result;
and (6) Petro Hunt was provided 1' a full opportunity to see
the evidence presented against it, to call and examine its
own witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses who
testified against it 0
11 15 In challenging the Appeals Board's denial of its
request for formal discovery, Petro-Hunt identifies no
evidence indicating that informal discovery procedures
were inadequate, that there were no less costly or
intimidating means available to gain access to the desired
information, or that the requests would not have caused
unreasonable delay. Instead, Petro-Hunt merely argues that
it was prevented from presenting evidence that independent
landmen " have been traditionally engaged by the oil and
gas industry on an independent contract basis" and that
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Elliot II conducted and continues to conduct an
independently established trade and occupation as a broker
of oil, gas and mineral leases.fl Petro-Hunt also asserts that
it was denied the opportunity to request Elliot's tax returns
to establish that Elliot " W$ engaged as an independent
contractor for other companies."

Pagel13
However, even assuming that Petro-Hunt's assertions are
true, Petro-Hunt is not alleviated from the obligation to
establish that informal discovery procedures were
inadequate to obtain the desired infonnation. Because
Petro-Hunt does not present any evidence indicating that it
attempted to obtain this infonnation through infonnal
procedures, or that it met the additional requirements for
formal discovery, we determine that there was no abuse of
discretion in the Appeals Board's decision to deny
Petro-Hunt's request for formal discovery. Moreover, we
believe that Petro-Hunt W$ provided a fair hearing under
the circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. § 3SA-4-204(3) (Supp.2008). Further,
administrative rule R994-204-303 lists several factors that
should be analyzed to determine if these two statutorily
required circumstances exist See generally Utah Admin.
Code R994-204-303.

'if 18 The administrative code goes on to explain that when
making an employee/independent contractor determination,
the facts of each case should be given " [s]pecial scrutiny"
and fl [t]he factors listed in ... [the administrative code] are
intended only as aids in the analysis of the facts of each
case. The degree of importance of each factor varies
depending on the service and the factual context in which it
is performed." Id. Based on this statutory authority, we
reject Petro-Hunt's notion that Utah statutory law mandates
categorizing landmen as independent contractors in favor of
recognizing that Utah law requires a specific inquiiy into
the facts present in each case when making an independent
contractor determination. Thus, we further conclude that the
Appeals Board acted rationally and reasonably in refusing
to adopt a Texas statute which generally categorizes
landmen as independent contractors. [3]

II. Texas and Utah Law Regarding Landmen

,r 16 Petro-Hunt next argues that the Appeals Board erred
as a matter of law by refusing to adopt a Texas statute
which generally defines landmen as independent
contractors, and by refusing to recognize Utah precedent
that automatically recognizes members of certain
professions as independent contractors. As a basis for its
Texas law argument, Petro-Hunt asserts that where Utah
law is silent on a matter, i.e., contains no regulations
regarding independent land.men, we should look to the law
of sister states, such as Texas, as persuasive authority. This
argument, however, is unpersuasive because even though
Utah law does not address landmen specifically, it clearly
requires tribunals to examine the facts of each case and
analyze specific factors when determining whether an
individual is an independent contractor or an employee for
pwposes of unemployment compensation.

1 17 More specifically, Utah Code section 35A-4-204
states that an individual performing services for wages
Wlder a contract of hire is considered an employee
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,i 19 For similar reasons, we also reject Petro-Hunt's
argument that the Appeals Board ened by not adopting "
long established Utah precedent" recognizing that
individuals engaged in certain " independently established
trades were not ' employees' of the companies they
contracted with." First, the case to which Petro-Hunt refers
fails to support the proposition that persons engaged in
certain professions automatically qualify as independent
contractors. In fact, in North American Builders, Inc. v.
Unemployment Compensation Division, 22 Utah 2d 338,
453 P.2d 142 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court examine<! the
specific facts of the case, including the administrative code
factors discussed above, to detcnnine whether the
individual was an employee or an independent contractor.
Seeid. at 143-45. The court made no generalizations about
certain professions and we decline to adopt that practice
here.
ID. The Appeals Board's Independent Contractor
Conclusion

unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that
(a) the individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as that involved in the contract
of hire for services; and
(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the means of performance of
those services, both under the individual's contract of hire
and in fact.

1 20 Finally, Petro-Hunt challenges the Appeals Board's
conclusion that Elliot was an employee because, as
Petro-Hunt asserts, Elliot was customarily engaged in an
independently established trade and Petro-Hunt " did not
have the right of or exercise direction or control over
Elliot's services." As previously stated, we will uphold the
Appeals Board's decision that Elliot was an employee and
not an independent contractor as Jong as we determine that
the decision was reasonable and rational. SeeTasters Ltd. v.
Department ofEmployment Sec.. 863 P.2d 12, 19 (Utah
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Ct.App.1993). To detennine if the Appeals Board's decision
is reasonable and rational, we apply the substantial evidence
test, which requires us to examine n all of the evidence
supporting the Board's findings and [detennine whether,]
despite the supporting facts and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not supported
by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. n Id.
Granting what the supreme court has referred to as "
maximum deference," we will uphold the basic facts the
Appeals Board relied on in reaching its ultimate conclusion
11
if there is evidence of any substance that can reasonably
be regarded as supporting the determination made.11 Allen &
Assocs. v. Board ofReview, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah
1987) (per curiam).
~ 21 In examining the Appeals Board's conclusion, we
begin with the proposition that Utah law presumes that

individuals perfonning services for wages are employees "
unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the division that (a)
the individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade ...; and (b) the individual has been and will
continue to be free from control or direction." Utah Code
Ann. § 35A-4-204{3)(a)-(b) {emphasis added). To assist a
tribunal with making a determination on both of these
requirements, the administrative code lists several factors
that tribunals should consider. See Utah Admin. Code
R994-204-303(l)(b). The rules make clear, however, that "
[t]he factors ... are intended only as aids in the analysis of
the facts of each case." See id. R. R994-204-303.

'ii 22 In this case, the Appeals Board analyzed first whether
Elliot was " customarily engaged in an independently
established trade." Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)
(Supp.2008). After concluding that inquiry in the negative,
the Appeals Board declined to examine whether Elliot was
free from control or direction. The Appeals Board reasoned
that because the statute's requirements for a finding of
independent contractor status are conjunctive, a
determination that the first requirement was not met negates
the obligation to analyze the second requirement On
appeal, Petro-Hunt challenges the Appeals Board's ultimate
conclusion that Elliot was an employee, not an independent
contractor, as well as the Appeals Board1s decision not to
examine the second independent contractor requirement,
i.e., whether Elliot was free from control or direction.

,r 23 While Petro-Hunt takes issue with the Board1s
conclusion under each factor, it does not identify any
disregarded evidence, but rather, 11 relies only upon its view
of the evidence before the administrative tribunals." Allen &
Assocs., 732 P.2d at 508. Thus, we explore each factor the
Appeals Board addressed to determine if the conclusion that
Page115

Elliot was a Petro-Hunt employee is, in fact, supported by

the evidence to the extent that the Appeals Board's ultimate
conclusion is reasonable and rational.
A. The Factors

124 Under the first factor, "Separate Place of Business,"
Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(1)(b)(i), the Appeals
Board examined whether Elliot " bas a place of business
separate from that of the employer. 11 Id. Based on the
evidence presented, the Appeals Board ruled that the
evidence weighed in favor of employment In reaching this
finding, the Appeals Board relied on Elliot's testimony in
which she indicated that she perfonned all of her
Petro-Hunt responsibilities in the company's office during
normal business hours, she worked forty to sixty hours a
week, and she did not maintain a separate place of business.
Petro-Hunt argues that the Appeals Board should have
concluded differently under this factor because the only
evidence before it was Elliot's self-serving testimony and
Petro-Hunt did not have an opportunity to discover if Elliot
was lying. This argument, however, is unavailing because
Petro-Hunt cross-examined Elliot and had an opportunity to
prc:scnt its own evidence.. ·on this issue. Without any
evidence to indicate otherwise, we uphold the Appeals
Board's conclusion that Elliot did not maintain a separate
place of business.

'if 25 Under the second factor, Tools and Equipment,
11

11

id.
R. R994-204-303(l)(b)(ii), the Appeals Board declined to
rule in favor of one party or the other. It concluded that the
evidence was " neutral" because both parties had provided a
similar amount of equipment, i.e., Elliot provided a laptop
and software while Petro-Hunt provided items such as a
copier, ~ and printer. Petro-Hunt disputes the Appeals
BoarcJ-s conclusion under this factor, asserting that
computers and software are expensive and thus, the
evidence under this factor " weighed heavily in favor of
independent contractor status." We decline, however, to
disturb the Appeals Board's determination, especially
considering the met that it is undisputed that both parties
provided some office ~ e n t

'ii 26 The third factor, " Other Clients," id. R.
R994-204-303(l)(b)(iii), addresses whether " [t]hcworlcer
regularly performs services of the same nature for other
customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively
for one employer." Id. Under this factor, the Appeals Board
admittedly stated that " the facts on this issue are unclear,"
but ultimately determined that the evidence weighed in
favor of employment The Appeals Board relied on Elliot's
testimony that she " did not have any other clients besides
Petro-Hunt" as well as the fact that Elliot's contract
contained a " non-compete clause, which she believed
prevented her from performing similar services to any other
client for a period of 12 months." The Appeals Board was
also persuaded by Elliot's testimony indicating that her two
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previous employers issued her W-2 tax fonns instead of
1099 forms.

1 27 Petro-Hunt

attacks the Appeals Board1s conclusion
under this factor on the basis that " Elliot admitted to
performing landman services for three other brokerage
companies, including [Hingeline, Bowman, and Baseline],n
and while working for Petro-Hunt, " Elliot was not required
to work full time and was permitted to work as much or as
little as she wished." However, neither of these two
arguments are compelling because Elliot testified that she
worked for Hingeline and Bowman prior to working for
Petro-Hunt and afterwards, she worked for Baseline. The
Appeals Board found Elliot's testimony was credible, and
Petro-Hunt provides no contradictory evidence to cast doubt
on her assertions. Moreover, reganling Elliot's hourly work
requirements, the Appeals Board is required to base its
detennination · on the circumstances as they existed at the
time of employment, not on those that could have existed
given the tenns of the contract SeeMcGuire v. Department
of Employment Sec., 768 P.2d 98S, 989 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). The only evidence presented on this issue
indicates that, regardless of the terms of her contract, Elliot
worked between forty and sixty homs a week, during
normal business hours, inside the company's Ephraim, Utah
office. Again, Petro-Hunt fails to present any evidence to
contradict Elliot's testimony. Because we conclude that the
Appeals
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Board's finding under this factor is supported by the
evidence, we will not disturb its determination that this
factor weighed in favor of employment.
,i 28 The fourth factor calls into question whether " [t]he
worker can realize a profit or risks a loss from expenses and
debts incurred through an independently established
business
activity."
Utah
Admin.
Code
R994-204-303(l)(b)(iv). Here, the Appeals Board
determined that " [Elliot] had very little overhead" ; she
worked in an office that Petro-Hunt had leased; she was
reimbursed for travel; other than a computer, she was
provided with all necessary office equipment; and all the
money she received was pure profit with no accompanying
risk of loss. Based on this evidence, the Appeals Board
determined that the facts under this factor weighed in favor
of employment. On appeal, Petro-Hunt tersely asserts that
the Appeals Board " ignored evidence of how Ms. Elliot
was paid and the underlying legal agreement between [the
two parties]," which allowed Elliot to " have hired helpers,
control[ ] her costs and take[ ] on additional work. n
However, even if Petro-Hunt's allegations were true, it fails
to establish how these facts undermine the Appeals Board's
conclusion that at the time Elliot was employed by
Petro-Hunt, she had no risk ofloss nor could she reali7.e a

profit.
~ 29 Under the fifth factor, " Advertising," id. R.
R994-204-303(1)(b)(v), Petro-Hunt asserts only that the
Appeals Board " erroneously focused its attention on what
Ms. Elliot chose not to do rather than on the legal rights she
had in her business relationship with Petro-Hunt."
Notwithstanding Elliot's potential right to advertise her
services, 1' the appropriate inquiry" examines the facts as
they existed at the time of employment, not what could
have been. SeeMcGuire, 768 P.2d at 988. Thus, we
conclude that Petro-Hunt's argument under this factor is
unavailing.

'd 30 Because Petro-Hunt concedes that the sixth factor is
inapplicable in this case, the only factor left to address is
the seventh, which examines business records and taX
forms. See Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(l)(b)(vii).
Here, the Appeals Board took note of the fact that
Petro-Hunt paid Elliot as an independent contractor,. issuing
her a l 099 tax fonn. It further noted that this factor ti
generally weighs in favor of independent contractor status,
- though it is not determinative by itself." Petro-Hunt argues
that the Appeals Board's finding under this factor was
wrong, and it should have been able to conduct discovery of
Elliot1s tax forms. However, given that Elliot admitted to
filing a 1099 in relation to her employment with
Petro-Hunt, and her testimony that she was unable to locate
the forms in question, there is no indication that such
discovery would have provided any benefit to Petro-Hunt,
especially given the Appeals Board's determination th.at this
factor weighed in favor of independent contractor status.

,r 31 After examining each factor individually, the A.ppeals
Board determined that n (a]t the time the services were
rendered, [Elliot] was not engaged in an independently
established trade or profession." Based on this con.cb.JSion,
the Appeals Board declined to analyu the additional
independent contractor requirement, that ti the in..d.i-.vidual
has been and will continue to be free from c<>~trol or
direction over the means of perfonnance of those services,
both under the individual's contract of hire and "i.xi fact"
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)(b) (Su.pp.2008).
Petro-Hunt argues that this was reversible erx-~. We,
however, disagree. To establish that an individ~ is an
independent contractor, Petro-Hunt must show "'1:::><::,th that
Elliot was engaged in an independently establish.~ trade
<;>Ver her
and that she was free from control or direction
services. Seeid. § 3SA-4-204(3)(a)-(b). Because th.c::: ~ppeals
Board concluded that Petro-Hunt failed to estat>--:I..Ish that
Elliot was engaged in an independently establisl::a_~ trade,
and we see no error in that conclusion, we agree:;=:
"""l\7t'ith the:
Appeals Board that it was not required to analyz:~ whetherElliot was free from control or direction.
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CONCLUSION

1 32 We conclude that the Appeals Board's discovery
ruling does not present a constitutional question, but rather,
a procedural
Pagell7

09

indicating that Elliot was engaged in the practice of
negotiating for mineral rights or negotiating for the
exploration or development of minerals. To the contrary,
the evidence presented indicates that Elliot was involved in
recording information related to mineral rights into her
computer, compiling reports, answering phones, and
sending and receiving emails.

question, reviewed for abuse of discretion. Further, we see
no error in the Appeals Board's conclusion that Petro-Hunt
failed to establish that formal discovery procedures were
necessary. We also conclude that the Appeals Board did not
err in failing to adopt a Texas statute addressing
independent landmen or Utah precedent categorizing certain
types ofwolkers as independent contractors. And finally,
we affinn the Appeals Board's ultimate conclusion that
Elliot was a Petro-Hunt employee, not an independent
contractor, on the basis that the Appeals Board's decision is
reasonable and rational.

'if 33 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge.

,r 34 I CONCUR EXCEPT AS.. TO SECTION I, IN
WHICH I CONCUR ONLY IN THE RESULT: RUSSELL
W. BENCH, Judge.

Notes:
[1] Petro-Hunt refers to Elliot as a landman, while Elliot
refers to herself as a land administrator. Because the
Appeals Board focused on the substance of her work and
not her title, this distinction is likely irrelevant
Nonetheless, Elliot testified that there is a distinction
between the two because landmen go out into the field
while land administrators work in an office.

~

[2] We do not mean to imply that there is a constitutional
right to discovery where administrative agencies have
fonnally adopted the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We are
merely acknowledging Petro-Hunt'.$ misconception to
clarify the origin of the right to discovery in administrative
proceedings.
[3] We also note that even if the Appeals Board were to
adopt the Texas law to which Petro-Hunt refers, that law is
not particularly helpful to Petro-Hunt's case. For example,
the Texas statute states that individuals are to be classified
as independent landmen, exempt from unemployment
insurance taxes, where three conditions are met, one of
which requires the individual to be " engaged primarily in
negotiating for the acquisition or divestiture of mineral
rights or negotiating business agreements that provide for
the exploration for or development of minerals." Tex.
Lab.Code Ann. § 201.077 (Vernon 1995). Under the facts
presented in this case, there is no evidence in the record
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35A-4-204 Definition of employment.
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, "employment'' means any service performed
for wages or under any contract of hire, whether written or oral, express or implied, including
service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a corporation.
(2) "Employment'' includes an individual's entire service performed within or both within and without
this state if one of Subsections (2)(a) through (k) is satisfied.
(a) The service is localized in this state. Service is localized within this state if:
(i) the service is performed entirely within the state; or
(ii) the ~ervice is performed both within and without the state, but the service performed without
the state is incidental to the individual's service within the state, for ~xample, is temporary or
transitory in nature or consists of isolated transactions. ·
(b)
(i} The service is not localized in any state but some of the service is performed in this state and
the individual's base of operations, or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which
the service is directed or controlled, is in this state; or
(ii) the individual's base of operations or place from which the service is directed or controlled
is not in any state in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual's
residence is in this state.

~

(c)
(i)
(A) The service is performed entirely outside this state and is not localized in any state;

(B) the worker is one of a class of employees who are required to travel outside this state in
performance of their duties; and

(C)
(I) the base of operations is in this state; or
{II) if there is no base of operations, the place from which the service is directed or

controlled is in this state.
(ii) Services covered by an election under Subsection 35A-4-310(3), and services covered by
an arrangement under Section 35A-4-106 between the division and the agency charged
with the administration of any other state or federal unemployment compensation law,
under which all services performed by an individual for an employing unit are considered
to be performed entirely within this state, are considered to be employment if the division
has approved an election of the employing unit for whom the services are performed,
under which the entire service of the individual during the period covered by the election is
considered to be insured work.
(d}
(i) The service is performed in the employ of the state, a county, city, town, school district, or
other political subdivision of the state, or in the employ of an Indian tribe or tribal unit or an
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing which is wholly owned by the state or
one of its political subdivisions or Indian tribes or tribal units it
{A) the service is excluded from employment as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(7):
(8) the service is not excluded from employment by Section 35A-4-205; and
{C) as to any county, city, town, school district, or political subdivision of this state, or an
instrumentality of the same or Indian tribes or tribal units, that service is either:
(I) required to be treated as covered employment as a condition of eligibility of employers in
this state for Federal Unemployment Tax Act employer tax credit;
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(II) required to be treated as covered employment by any other requirement of the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, as amended; or
(Ill) not required to be treated as covered employment by any requirement of the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, but coverage of the service is elected by a majority of the
members of the governing body of the political subdivision or instrumentality or tribal unit
in accordance with Section 35A-4-310.
(ii) Benefits paid on the basis of service performed in the employ of this state shall be financed
by payments to the division instead of contributions in the manner and amounts prescribed
by Subsections 35A-4-311(2)(a) and (4).
(iii) Benefits paid on the basis of service performed in the employ of any other governmental
entity or tribal unit described in this Subsection (2) shall be financed by payments to the
division in the manner and amount prescribed by the applicable provisions of Section
35A-4-311.
(e) The service is performed by an individual in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational,
or other organization, but only if:
(i) the service is excluded from employment as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(8), solely by reason of Section 3306(c)(8) of that act; and
(ii) the organization had four or more individuals in employment for some portion of a day in
each of 20 different weeks, whether or not the weeks were consecutive, within either the
current ·or preceding calendar year, regardless of whether they were employed at the same
moment of time.
·
(f)
(i) The service is performed outside the United States, except in Canada, in the employ of an
American employer, other than service that is considered employment under the provisions
of this Subsection (2) or the parallel provisions of another state's law if:
(A) the employer's principal place of business in the United States is located in this state;
(B) the employer has no place of business in the United States but is:
(I) an individual who is a resident of this state;
(II) a corporation that is organized under the laws of this state; or
{Ill) a partnership or trust in which the number of partners or trustees who are residents of
this state is greater than the number who are residents of any one other state; or
(C) none of the criteria of Subsections (2)(f)(i)(A) and (B) is met but:
(I) the employer has elected coverage in this state; or
(II) the employer fails to elect coverage in any state and the individual has filed a claim for
benefits based on that service under the law of this state.
(ii) "American employer'' for purposes of this Subsection (2) means a person who is:
(A) an individual who is a resident of the United States;
(B) a partnership if 2/3 or more of the partners are residents of the United States;
(C) a trust if all of the trustees are residents of the United States:
(D) a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state;
{E) a limited liability company organized under the laws of the United States or of a state;
(F) a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the United States or of any state;
or
(G) a joint venture if 2/3 or more of the members are individuals, partnerships, corporations,
limited liability companies, or limited liability partnerships that qualify as American
employers.
(g) The service is performed:
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{i) by an officer or member of the crew of an American vessel on or in connection with the
vessel; and
(ii) the operating office from which the operations of the vessel, operating on navigable waters
within, or within and without, the United States, is ordinarily and regularly supervised,
managed, directed, and controlled within this state.
(h) A tax with respect to the service in this state is required to be paid under any federal law
imposing a tax against which credit may be taken for contributions required to be paid into a
state unemployment fund or that, as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, is required to be covered under this chapter.
(i)
{i) Notwithstanding Subsection 35A-4-205(1)(p), the service is performed:
(A) as an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable
products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages other than milk, or laundry .or dry
cleaning services, for the driver's principal; or
(8) as a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver,
engaged on a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of and the transmission to the
salesman's principal, except for sideline sales activities on behalf of some other person, of
orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other
similar establishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business
operations.
{ii) The term "employment" as used in this Subsection (2) includes services described in
Subsection (2){i){i) performed only if:
{A) the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of the services are to be
performed personally by the individual;
(B) the individual does not have a substantial investment in facilities used in connection with
the performance of the services other than in facilities for transportation; and
(C) the services are not in the nature of a single transaction that is not part of a continuing
relationship with the person for whom the services are performed.
0) The service is performed by an individual in agricultural labor as defined in Section 35A-4-206.
{k) The service is domestic service performed in a private home, local college club, or local
chapter of a college fraternity or sorority performed for a person who paid cash remuneration
of $1,000 or more during any calendar quarter in either the current calendar year or the
preceding calendar year to individuals employed in the domestic service.
(3) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied, are considered to be employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown
to the satisfaction of the division that:
{a) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the contract of hire for services;
and
(b) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the means of
performance of those services, both under the individual's contract of hire and in fact.
(4) If an employer, consistent with a prior declaratory ruling or other formal determination by the
division, has treated an individual as independently established and it is later determined that
the individual is in fact an employee, the department may by rule provide for waiver of the
employer's retroactive liability for contributions with respect to wages paid to the individual prior
to the date of the division's later determination, except to the extent the individual has filed a
claim for benefits.
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R994-204-303. Factors for Determining Independent
Contractor Status
Latest version.

Latest Version

Updated Version

Related Notices

Services will be excluded under Section 35A-4-204 if the service meets the
requirements of this rule. Special scrutiny of the facts is required to assure that the
form of a service relationship does not obscure its substance, that is, whether the
worker is independently established in a like trade, occupation, profession or
business and is free from control and direction. The factors listed in Subsections
R994-204-303(1 )(b) and R994-204-303(2)(b) of this section are intended only as

aids in the analysis of the facts of each case. The degree of importance of each
factor varies depending on the service and the factual context in which it is
performed. Additionally, some factors do not apply to certain services and,
therefore, should not be considered.
(1) Independently Established.
(a) An individual will be considered customarily engaged in an independe~tly
established trade, occupation, profession, or business if the individual is, at the
time the service is performed, regularly engaged in a trade, occupation, profession,
or business of the same nature as the service performed, and the trade,
occupation, profession, or business is established independently of the alleged
employer. In other words, an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business is created and exists apart from a relationship with a
particular employer and does not depend on a relationship with any one employer
for its continued existence.
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will determine whether a worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business:
(i) Separate Place of Business. The worker has a-place of business separate from
that of the employer.
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(ii) Tools and Equipment. The worker has a substantial investment in the tools,

equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services. However,
11

"tools of the trade used by certain trades or crafts do not necessarily demonstrate
independence.
(iii) Other Clients. The worker regularly performs services of the same nature for

other customers or clients and is not required to work exclusively for one employer.
(iv) Profit or Loss. The worker can realize a profit or risks a loss froin expenses and
debts incurred through an independently established business activity.
(v) Advertising. The worker advertises services in telephone directories,
newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or by other methods clearly demonstrating

~

an effort to generate business.
(vi) Licenses. The worker has obtained any required and customary business,
trade, or professional licenses.
(vii) Business Records and Tax Forms. The worker maintains records or
documents that validate expenses, business asset valuation or income earned so
he or she may file self-employment and other business tax forms with the Internal
Revenue Service and other agencies.
(c) If an employer proves to the satisfadion of the Department that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession
or business of the same nature as the service in question, there will be a rebuttable
presumption that the employer did not have the right of or exercise direction or
control over the service.
(2).. -Control and Direction.
(a} When an employer retains the right to control and direct the performance of a
service, or actually exercises control and direction over the worker who performs
the service, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to
the manner and means by which that result is to be accomplished, the worker is an
employee of the employer for the purposes of the Act.
(b) The following factors, if applicable, will be used as aids in determining whether
an employer has the right of or exercises control and direction over the service of a
worker:
(i) Instructions. A worker who is required to comply with other persons' instructions
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about how the service is to be performed is ordinarily an employee. This factor is
present if the employer for whom the service is perfonned has the right to require
compliance with the instructions.
(ii) Training. Training a worker by requiring or expecting an experienced person to

work with the worker, by corresponding with the worker, by requiring the worker to
attend meetings, or by using other methods, indicates that the employer for whom
the service is performed expects the service to be performed in a particular method

0iV

or manner.
(iii) Pace or Sequence. A requirement that the service must be provided at a pace

or ordered sequence of duties imposed by the employer indicates control or
direction. The coordinating and scheduling of the services of more than one worker
does not indicate control and direction.
(iv) Work on Employer's Premises. A requirement that the service be performed on
the employer's premises indicates that the employer for whom the service is
performed has retained a right to·supervise and oversee the manner in which the
service is performed, especially if the service could be performed elsewhere.
(v) Personal Service. A requirement that the service must be performed personally
and may not be assigned to others indicates the right to control or direct the
manner in which the work is performed.
(vi) Continuous Relationship. A continuous service relationship between the worker
and the employer indicates that an employer-employee relationship exists. A
continuous relationship may exist where work is performed regularly or at
frequently recurring although irregular intervals. A continuous relationship does not
exist where the worker is contracted to complete specifiqally identified projects,
even though the service relationship may extend over a"significant period of time.
(vii) Set Hours of Work. The establishment of set hours or a specific number of
hours of work by the employer indicates control.
(viii) Method of Payment. Payment by the hour, week, or month points to an
employer-employee relationship, provided that this method of payment is not just a
convenient way of paying progress billings as part of a fixed price agreed upon as
the cost of a job. Control may also exist when the employer determines the method
of payment.
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